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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Counsel for Jean E. Brytus and seven other named 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Hon. John P. Fullam, Senior United States District Judge for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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plaintiffs, who filed a successful class action against 
plaintiffs' former employer Spang & Co. for violating the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 
U.S.C. S 1001 et seq. (ERISA) by failing to distribute the 
plan surplus to retired workers, filed a motion for attorneys' 
fees from the common fund they had created. The district 
court initially denied the motion on the ground these 
counsel were entitled to and would receive counsel fees to 
be paid by Spang under the statutory fee provision for 
prevailing parties under ERISA, and therefore were not also 
entitled to recovery from the common fund. In its opinion 
on reconsideration, the court maintained essentially the 
same position but added that it was exercising its equitable 
powers in reaching its decision. Counsel appeals from that 
order. The threshold issue before us is whether we have 
jurisdiction to consider this interesting issue at this time. 
 
I. 
 
In 1995, the district court, relying on our prior decision 
in Delgrosso v. Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(relating to a similar pension fund at a different Spang 
plant), found that Spang had wrongfully acquired the 
surplus assets of an ERISA-protected retirement fund 
instead of distributing the surplus proportionately to the 
retirees, see app. at 172-91; app at 193-97, and we 
affirmed the judgment of the district court. See 79 F.3d 
1137 (3d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision), cert. 
denied, 117 S.Ct. 70 (1996). After the district court's order 
on the merits, two of the counsel for the plaintiff class, 
Daniel P. McIntyre and William T. Payne (referred to as 
"counsel"), sought reasonable attorneys' fees under the fee- 
shifting provision of ERISA and also "invoke[d] the common 
fund doctrine as warranting a recovery of fees out of the 
fund they have recovered on behalf of the class." App. at 
219. By 1995, when counsel filed this motion, the "common 
fund" consisted of approximately $11.5 million dollars. 
 
Spang did not contest the counsel's right to a reasonable 
attorneys' fee as a prevailing party under ERISA, but did 
contest the hourly rates to be applied and the costs 
claimed. In particular, Spang objected to the request of 
Payne and McIntyre for a total of $467,833, app. at 243, 
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because that request was based on Payne's rate at $275 per 
hour and McIntyre's rate at $300 per hour. Spang argued 
that the appropriate fee was approximately $380,082, 
based on hourly rates of $260 per hour for McIntyre, and 
$220 per hour for Payne. App. at 363. Although the district 
court assured counsel that they would receive a reasonable 
rate for every hour worked, it did not resolve the dispute 
over the hourly rate. 
 
The United Steelworkers Association ("the Union"), as 
intervenor, opposed counsel's request for a fee award of 
approximately 20-30% of the $11.5 million recovered, or 
approximately $2,300,000 to $3,450,000. It argued that all 
of counsel's reasonable fees would be paid by the 
wrongdoing employer, and contended that it would be 
inconsistent with ERISA policy to permit diminution of the 
employees' fund. The district court denied counsel's request 
for attorneys' fees from the common fund, finding "that 
because this action was brought under a fee-shifting 
provision of ERISA and was litigated to judgment, the 
attorneys' fees to be awarded in this action are to be 
governed according to the principles of awarding fees under 
the fee-shifting provision." Memorandum Order, July 14, 
1997 at 5-6. In its subsequent reconsideration order, the 
court also stated that "[c]onsidering the fact that the result 
in this case is principally driven by ERISA, the Court, in 
the exercise of its equitable powers, finds that under the 
totality of the circumstances, an award of reasonable 
attorneys' fees based on an unenhanced lodestar formula 
plus expenses is the only reasonable method of 
compensating Plaintiff-Participants' counsel for their 
services." Memorandum Order, August 15, 1997 at 5-6. 
Counsel for plaintiffs now appeal the order denying the 
request for a fee award from the common fund. 
 
The parties have focused their principal briefs on the 
merits of the district court's order denying counsel fees 
from the common fund created from their efforts. Counsel 
note that the great bulk of the $12 million fund will go to 
class members other than those they represented who will 
receive from the fund four times more than their then total 
pension, that they invited the district court to reduce any 
fees they might receive from the common fund by the 
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amount of statutory fees awarded, and that only by 
awarding them a share of the fund they produced will they 
be able to be compensated for the risks they faced and the 
success they achieved.1 They cite to cases in other courts 
that have allowed both an ERISA statutory fee and an 
award from the common fund, arguing that without this 
incentive ERISA plaintiffs may not be able to secure 
competent counsel who will assist them in gaining access 
to the courts to secure their rights under the statute. 
 
The Union counters that the ERISA cases in which 
counsel recovered from the common fund are cases that 
were settled rather than litigated to judgment, as here. The 
Union also argues that it would be contrary to the remedial 
provisions and purposes of ERISA to require plan 
participants to give up pension assets to enhance the 
income of counsel who will receive reasonable fees from the 
defendant employer. The Union treats the district court's 
order as one that was within its discretion, a discretion it 
argues we should not disturb. 
 
These are provocative arguments that have not yet been 
addressed by this court. Both parties believe we have 
jurisdiction, and gave the matter no attention until we 
directed briefing on the issue. They still maintain we have 
jurisdiction, treating the district court's order as a collateral 
order under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 
541 (1949). 
 
II. 
 
The unbroken precedent of this court is to the effect that 
an award of attorneys' fees will not be reviewed if the 
amount of the fees have not been quantified because such 
an order is not a final order. See, e.g., Polonski v. Trump Taj 
Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998); Ragan v. 
Tri-County Excavating, Inc., 62 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 
1995); Pennsylvania v. Flaherty, 983 F.2d 1267, 1277 (3d 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Supreme Court has held that contingency is not a factor that is 
allowed in the calculation of the statutory fee under the lodestar 
formula. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean 
Air, 483 U.S. 711, 716-28 (1987). 
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Cir. 1993); Frangos v. Doering Equip. Corp., 860 F.2d 70, 72 
(3d Cir. 1988). Were the rule otherwise we might find 
ourselves facing two distinct appeals, one on the decision 
whether to award fees and thereafter an appeal regarding 
the amount awarded. In this case, although the district 
court had decided a statutory fee would be awarded and 
had given some indication of its inclination, thefinal 
amount had not yet been fixed. Thus, an appeal with 
respect to the statutory fee would not be ripe. 
 
Counsel argue that the issues relating to the statutory fee 
are distinct from those relating to the common fee award, 
and in support note that the fees are paid from different 
sources -- the statutory fee from Spang and the common 
fund fee from those who benefited from their services. 
Therefore, they argue, this order is included within the 
small class of decisions held appealable in Cohen as final 
under S 1291 even though they do not terminate the 
underlying litigation. To be eligible for review under Cohen, 
the order must (1) conclusively determine the disp uted 
question, (2) resolve an important issue completel y 
separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be  effectively 
unreviewable on appeal at the conclusion of the litigation. 
See Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545-47 (1949); Michelson v. Citicorp 
National Servs. Inc., 138 F.3d 508, 517 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 
Applying the Cohen factors here, it is apparent that the 
district court's order, although admittedly its last word on 
counsel's entitlement to fees from the common fund, does 
not conclusively determine the "disputed question" of 
attorneys' fees because the amount of the statutory fees 
under ERISA it approved in principle is not yet quantified. 
 
Perhaps most important, we do not regard the district 
court's denial of a common fund fee award as separate from 
the remaining issue of the amount of statutory attorneys' 
fees. Indeed they are intertwined. Counsel seeks to draw a 
distinction between the statutory fee, which is awarded to 
the prevailing party, and award from the common fund, 
which is directly earmarked for the attorneys themselves. 
We will not address the validity of this distinction because, 
even if valid, it fails to undercut the indisputable fact that 
the fee requests are interconnected and neither is 
"completely separate" from the remaining attorneys' fee 
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issue in the case. In this connection, counsel for plaintiffs 
would appear to have acknowledged such a linkage in their 
invitation to the district court to deduct from a common 
fund fee award the amount of any statutory fee awarded. 
 
We cannot assume that when the court rules finally on 
the statutory fees it will not consider its decision denying 
counsel fees from the common fund. Similarly, had the 
court ruled favorably to counsel on the entitlement to the 
common fund fee, it is likely that the district court would 
have considered that award in fixing the statutory fee. 
Decisions holding that an order awarding counsel afixed 
recovery as an equitable right to a common fund is afinal 
order, Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 480-82, 
nn.5 & 7 (1980); In re Nineteen Appeals Fire Litigation 
Arising out of the San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel, 982 F.2d 
603, 608-10 (1st Cir. 1992); Overseas Development Disc 
Corp. v. Sangamo Constr. Co., 840 F.2d 1319, 1324 (7th 
Cir. 1988), are inapposite. Those cases do not involve both 
a common fund award and an award of statutory attorneys' 
fees. A fortiori, none of those cases involved the impediment 
of a statutory fee that was not yet final because it had not 
been quantified. 
 
We view our decision holding the order denying recovery 
from the common fund not yet appealable as consistent 
with the underlying rationale for denying review of 
interlocutory orders -- to avoid piecemeal appeals. See 
Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Savings Bank, 947 F.2d 
49, 54 n.5 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[t]his rule reflects federal policy 
against piecemeal appeals").2 
 
Accordingly, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to 
review the order under the Cohen doctrine. See Gulfstream 
Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp. 485 U.S. 271, 276 
(1988) ("If the order at issue fails to satisfy any one of these 
requirements, it is not appealable under the collateral-order 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Counsel contend that the denial of appellate review now will preclude 
appellate review in the future because the common fund will be 
distributed and no longer available even following a successful appeal. 
We take no position on this possibility, but note that counsel may 
request that the district court make only a partial distribution of the 
common fund after it quantifies the statutory fee award. 
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exception to S 1291"). For the reasons set forth, we will 
dismiss the appeal. 
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